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本文首先建立了一个模型,分析了大股东在作股权质押决策时如何在控制权与现金流权之间权衡,并提出大股东质押股权的可能性与股权集中度正相关、与股价被高估的程度正相关的假设,随后的实证研究验证了根据理论模型推导结果提出的假设。本文随后分析了大股东质押股权的行为后果。实证研究表明,如果上市公司的终极控制人是国有企业或政府机构,大股东质押股权并不必然导致盈余管理或资金侵占。当上市公司的终极控制人为非国有实体或个人时,盈余管理和资金侵占都可能是大股东股权质押的行为后果。本文的结论对相关部门加强对大股东股权质押行为的监管、改善金融生态环境具有借鉴意义。
This paper first establishes a model to analyze how the majority shareholder makes a trade-off between control right and cash flow right when making the equity pledge decision, and puts forward that the possibility that the majority shareholder pledge the equity is positively related to the ownership concentration and the stock price is overvalued , And the subsequent empirical studies validate the hypotheses proposed based on the results of theoretical models. This article then analyzes the consequences of pledging shares by large shareholders. Empirical studies show that if the ultimate controlling shareholder of a listed company is a state-owned enterprise or a government agency, pledging shares by the majority shareholder does not necessarily lead to earnings management or capital encroachment. When the ultimate controller of a listed company is a non-state-owned entity or individual, earnings management and fund encroachment may all be the result of the pledge of majority shareholder equity. The conclusion of this paper is of reference to the relevant departments to strengthen the regulation of large shareholders’ equity pledge and improve the financial ecological environment.