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CEO任期的长短显著影响着董事会关于CEO薪酬的决策过程,CEO薪酬的总体水平随着其任期的延长而上升,薪酬体系的设计也日益趋向于迎合CEO的个人偏好。这种长任期CEO薪酬现象,虽然有悖委托代理理论的内在逻辑,但却是一个客观存在的事实。本文试图跳出委托代理理论的窠臼,从人力资本、经理主义和社会心理等视角对长任期CEO薪酬现象进行阐释,揭示导致长任期CEO薪酬现象的深层机理,并且对董事会关于长任期CEO薪酬决策的本真面貌进行还原。
The length of the CEO’s term significantly affects the board’s decision-making process on CEO pay. The overall level of CEO pay rises with the extension of his tenure, and the design of the pay system tends to cater to the CEO’s personal preference. This long term CEO pay phenomenon, although contrary to the inherent logic of principal-agent theory, but it is an objective reality. This paper attempts to jump out of the pervasiveness of the theory of principal-agent theory, interpreting long-term CEO compensation from the perspectives of human capital, managerialism and social psychology, revealing the deep mechanism of CEO remuneration resulting in long-term term, The true appearance of the restoration.