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创业企业普遍存在着资金短缺的问题,创业投资则有效解决了创业企业的融资困难.一旦投资者进入到创业活动中,项目要想成功就需要企业家和投资者付出一定的努力.此时投资者需要最优的融资契约,以此激励企业家付出高水平的努力,使自己的利润最大化.本文在努力水平事先隐藏且无法核实的前提下,通过建立一个两阶段的融资模型,得到了两份优化的融资契约.论文进一步表明,企业家努力的边际成本与投资预期净现值的相对大小是进行融资契约选择的关键影响因素,即当投资预期净现值相对于努力成本较小时,不存在可行的契约;当投资预期净现值相对于努力成本较大时,最优融资契约将以两种形式出现:不论第一期的利润额多少,第二阶段再融资概率都接近于1的(FC1)和根据第一期的利润额确定第二阶段再融资概率的(FC2).由于双边道德风险的存在,无论投资者选择何种融资契约,都不会在投资的第二阶段与企业家共同努力.
Venture capital enterprises generally exist the problem of shortage of funds, venture capital investment is an effective solution to the financing difficulties of start-up enterprises.Once investors into the entrepreneurial activities, the success of the project requires entrepreneurs and investors to make some efforts to invest at this time Who need the optimal financing contract, in order to encourage entrepreneurs to pay a high level of effort to maximize their profits.This paper conceals the level of efforts in advance and can not be verified under the premise of the establishment of a two-stage financing model, obtained Two optimized financing contracts.The paper further shows that the relative size of the marginal cost of entrepreneurial efforts and the expected net present value of investment is the key factor for the choice of financing contract, that is, when the expected net present value of investment is less than the effort cost, There is no viable contract. When the expected NPV of investment is larger than the cost of hard work, the optimal financing contract will appear in two forms: the second-stage refinancing probability is close to 1 regardless of the first-stage profit (FC1) and the second-stage refinancing probability (FC2) based on the first-stage profit margin.Because of the existence of bilateral moral hazard, investors What financing contract selection, will not be in the second phase with the joint efforts of entrepreneurs to invest.