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现有关于地方政府行为模式的几种理解,相互之间难以兼容,也难以解释看似矛盾的地方政府行为。本研究提出重叠利益行动者模式,认为:地方政府多样化的行为表现,源自于其行为的利益归属区间的不同,地方政府在政府利益与其它利益重叠形成的复杂区间中进行巧妙的规避选择,一般会优先采取利益高度重合区的举措,积极推动多重利益区的行动,有时也会强力推动政府单独利益区的行为。根据利益重叠情况采取相应的行为策略,是地方政府广泛存在的一种行为方式,这种行为策略也导致了政府既有所作为又难以高效进行社会治理。文章以劳动关系领域的地方政府行为为例,对此进行了阐释。
The existing understanding of local government behavior patterns is not compatible with each other and it is hard to explain the seemingly contradictory behavior of local governments. This study proposes the model of overlapping interest actors, that: the diversified behavior of local governments, stems from the different interests of their own attribution interval, the local government in the government and other interests overlap the complex formation of the complex interval to avoid the choice , Generally take the initiative to take a high degree of overlap of interests initiatives, and actively promote the action of multiple interest zones, and sometimes strongly promote the government’s separate interest zone behavior. According to the overlap of interests, adopting corresponding behavior tactics is a widespread behavior of local governments. This kind of behavior tactics also leads to the government not only doing well but also difficult to carry out social governance efficiently. The article takes the local government in the field of labor relations as an example to explain this.