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深圳国有企业投资监管制度自上世纪90年代以来大致经历了集中监管、部分投资权限下放、明晰国有企业投资决策权责三个阶段,呈现出决策权限下移、市场化决策、确定投资监管的权责边界的变化特点。样本数据表明,“集中监管”不利于国有企业投资;部分权限下放后,投资规模和投资效益明显增加;明晰国有企业投资决策权责,投资规模和投资效益进一步增加。由此说明:投资监管制度演变导致的交易成本下降是促进国有企业提高投资效益的基础,针对不同功能国有经济的投资监管制度的调整和完善是深圳经济特区国有企业投资监管制度的改革方向。
Since the 90s of last century, the investment supervision system of state-owned enterprises in Shenzhen has undergone three stages: centralized supervision, partial decentralization of investment rights and clear rights and responsibilities of state-owned enterprises in investment decision-making. It shows that the power of decision-making authority has been shifted down, the market-oriented decision- Responsibility changes the characteristics of the border. The sample data shows that “centralized supervision” is not conducive to the investment of state-owned enterprises. After the partial delegation of authority, the investment scale and investment efficiency have obviously increased. The responsibilities and responsibilities of investment decisions of state-owned enterprises have been clarified, and the investment scale and investment returns have further increased. Therefore, it shows that the transaction cost reduction caused by the evolution of investment supervision system is the basis of promoting the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises. The adjustment and perfection of the investment supervision system of state-owned economy with different functions is the reform direction of the investment supervision system of state-owned enterprises in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.