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现代哲学是对基础的探求;当代哲学则广泛地把这种探求作为错误而加以摒弃。在此,我无意反驳基础主义,而是把它退出历史舞台视为理所当然。这样做也就意味着认定某些形式下的怀疑论论题已被击败,这一点尤其适用以下这种形式的论题:“我们一致认为合理的这种观点或那种观点不能面对其可能的相反的观点而得辩护,因此,它是武断的、非理性的。”任何一个这样的论题,都基于一种对基础的强烈要求。我一概认为,都是错误的。 然而,我相信,我们仍会受以往基础主义幽灵的骚扰,每一个幽灵都以一种使人困惑的相对主义来威胁我们。我将要讨论的诸种基础主义幽灵,与其说是通过表面相似性,不如说是通过我的剖析而联系起来的。这些幽灵到处散布认识论的消亡,而我只要可能就把这些问题明确地与科学联系起来。在任何情况下,我都将关注科学的某些实用方面。我认为科学是给我们提供模型的。在科学哲学和一般认识论中,如果我们要使用这些模型对我们来说,决定性的就是要鉴别把我们自己与那些模型联系起来的行为之自主性。简言之,这指的是相对于纯科学的应用科学之自主性。这意味着我们需要根据具体的科学家和科学共同体的观点来进行思考,在此只集中论述他们的理论与信念的内容。
Modern philosophy is the search for foundations; contemporary philosophy rejects this quest widely as a mistake. Here, I do not intend to refute basicism, but to take it out of the historical arena for granted. In so doing, this means that the identification of some forms of skepticism has been defeated, and this applies in particular to the following form: “We agree that a reasonable one or the same one can not face its possible opposite Therefore, it is arbitrary and irrational. ”Any such topic is based on a strong demand for foundation. I think everything is wrong. However, I believe we will still be harassed by the ghosts of the previous foundations, each of us threatening us with a perplexing relativism. The kinds of Fundamentalist ghosts I will discuss are not so much linked to mere surface appearance as they are to my analysis. These ghosts scatter the demise of epistemology everywhere, and whenever possible I can relate these questions to science. In any case, I will focus on some practical aspects of science. I think science gives us the model. In philosophy of science and general epistemology, it is decisive for us to use these models for us to identify the autonomy of our actions that link ourselves to those models. In short, this refers to the autonomy of applied science relative to pure science. This means that we need to think in terms of specific scientists and scientific communities, where we concentrate only on the content of their theories and beliefs.