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基于消费者的策略购买行为,研究销售开始时提供某种新产品的销售商1和销售开始一段时间后提供模仿产品的销售商2的竞争性产品定价。通过分析策略消费者购买行为,分析销售商之间的博弈过程,证明了该博弈存在唯一的子博弈精炼纳什均衡,得到了新产品的最优跨期定价、模仿产品的最优定价及两销售商的最大利润。研究还发现,凭借先动优势,作为领导者的销售商1所获利润大于作为跟随者的销售商2所获利润;与消费者为短视型时的销售情况相比,消费者的策略性降低了新产品的两期价格、模仿产品的价格及销售商1的利润,但有可能增加销售商2的利润;消费者的策略购买行为对销售商2利润的影响取决于销售周期、模仿产品的质量与投放市场的时间、消费者第二阶段对产品的估价折扣等参数的取值。最后的数值试验也验证了所得结论的正确性。
Based on consumer’s tactical purchasing behavior, investigating the pricing of competing products by seller 1 who offered some new product at the beginning of the sale and seller 2 who provided the imitation product after some time of sale. By analyzing the strategic consumer buying behavior and analyzing the game process among sellers, it is proved that the game has the only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and the optimal intertemporal pricing of the new product, the optimal pricing of the imitation product and the two sales Business’s maximum profit. The study also found that with the first-mover advantage, the profit earned by the leader 1 was greater than that with the seller 2 as the follower; the consumer’s strategy was lower compared with the sales when the consumer was short-sighted The price of two periods of the new product, the price of the product, and the profit of the seller 1 may increase the profit of the seller 2; the influence of the consumer’s strategic buying behavior on the profit of the seller 2 depends on the sales cycle and the imitation of the product Quality and time to market, the second phase of the consumer product discount valuation and other parameters. The final numerical experiment also verifies the correctness of the conclusion.