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安全监督检查人员是否尽职主要取决于两个方面因素,一方面是安全监督检查人员工作的积极性,另一方面安全监督检查人员选择科学性的工作能力。本文通过对安全监督检查人员与矿工之间的静态博弈分析,揭示了煤矿企业安全管理中存在的一个重要问题,就是煤矿企业为了安全制定政策,但是在实际中安全政策往往偏离原来所制定的目标。安全监督检查人员与矿工博弈的混合策略纳什均衡很好地解释了煤矿企业制定的安全政策偏离目标的现象,主要是因为我们在分析矿工不安全行为时很少研究安全监督检查人员行为选择对矿工不安全行为的影响,而安全监督检查人员尽职行为的选择在一定程度上决定了矿工选择不安行为的概率。
The due diligence of safety supervision and inspection personnel mainly depends on two factors, one is the enthusiasm of safety supervision and inspection personnel, on the other hand, safety supervision and inspection personnel choose scientific working ability. Through the static game analysis between safety inspectors and miners, this paper reveals that an important problem in the safety management of coal mines is that coal mines make policies in order to make safety. However, in reality, safety policies often deviate from the originally set targets . Mixed strategy of safety inspectors and miners game Nash equilibrium well explains the deviation of safety policies formulated by coal mining enterprises from the target mainly because we seldom study safety supervision and inspectors’ behavior when analyzing unsafe behavior of miners. Unsafe behavior, and the choice of due diligence by safety inspectors to a certain extent determines the probability that miners will choose to behave uneasy.