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为研究供应链入侵对供应链成员渠道选择及决策的影响,本文考虑了一个由在位供应商、潜在入侵供应商和在位零售商组成的两阶段供应链系统。通过不同结构下的Stackelberg博弈模型分析发现,供应链入侵会使供应商的批发价格和产品的零售价格都有所降低,然而供应链结构的不同导致渠道或产品之间的竞争对供应链成员的决策和收益的影响不同;在一定情况下,竞争加剧会使供应链成员获利,并且零售商的最优选择是同时销售两种竞争性的产品,而在位供应商通过开通直销渠道入侵零售市场对在位供应商和潜在入侵供应商都有利。
To study the impact of supply chain intrusion on channel selection and decision-making of supply chain members, this paper considers a two-phase supply chain system consisting of in-position suppliers, potential invaders and in-service retailers. Through the Stackelberg game model under different structures, it is found that the supply chain intrusion will reduce the wholesale prices of suppliers and the retail prices of products, however, the different supply chain structure leads to the competition between channels or products to the supply chain members The influence of decision-making and return is different. In some cases, the aggravating competition will benefit the members of the supply chain, and the optimal choice of retailers is to sell two competing products at the same time, while the incumbent suppliers invade the retail sales by opening direct sales channels The market is good for both incumbents and potential invaders.