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本文基于融资约束假设,采用异质性随机前沿模型探讨了现金持有对企业投资效率的影响,并研究了管理者权力在这一过程中发挥的作用。研究发现:企业现金持有行为能够起到减弱投资无效率的作用。但是这种减弱作用在管理者权力较高的企业中受到明显抑制,并且企业内部控制无法对高权力管理者的负面影响进行有效治理。这表明,适当约束管理者权力、加强企业内部控制制度建设仍是企业应当考虑的问题。本文的研究结论在肯定权衡理论对企业现金持有动机的基础上,为代理理论的解释提供了新的经验证据。
Based on the hypothesis of financing constraints, this paper uses the heterogeneous stochastic frontier model to explore the impact of cash holdings on the efficiency of business investment, and studies the role of managers’ power in this process. Research shows that the cash holding behavior of enterprises can reduce the inefficiency of investment. However, this weakening effect is obviously restrained in the enterprises with higher managerial power, and the internal control of enterprises can not effectively control the negative influence of the high-power managers. This shows that proper restraint of the power of managers to strengthen the building of enterprise internal control system is still an issue that businesses should consider. The conclusion of this paper is based on the affirmation that the trade-off theory has the motive for the cash holdings of enterprises, and provides new empirical evidence for the explanation of agency theory.