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针对新股询价“价高者得”的配给规则,本文提出与之相对应的“价近者得”规则,运用进化博弈理论,对询价对象群体建立单群体模仿者动态模型,分析两种规则下询价对象的报价行为和新股发行价格的形成,并采用2009年6月到2010年10月我国中小企业板市场发行的新股数据,对两种规则下询价对象的进化稳定策略进行数值分析。结果表明,当询价对象预期抑价率均值足够大时,“价高者得”规则下询价对象有高报价的倾向,而“价近者得”规则下询价对象倾向于合理报价,改变我国现行“价高者得”的新股分配规则,采取“价近者得”的规则有助于提高IPO询价效率。
According to the rules of rationing of new stock inquiry “higher bidder ”, this paper puts forward the “”, , Analyzes the quotation behavior of object under inquiry and the formation of new share issue price under the two rules, and uses the new share data issued by China’s SME board market from June 2009 to October 2010, and analyzes the evolution of inquiry object under the two rules Stabilization strategy for numerical analysis. The results show that when the average expected underpricing rate of the inquiry object is large enough, the object under quotation has the tendency of higher quotation under the rule of In the reasonable quotation, changing the current share-issuing rule of “the highest bidder” in our country and adopting the rule of “near bidder” can help raise the efficiency of IPO inquiry.