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董事会资本、高管激励契约与研发投入之间的关系一直是国内外学者研究的热点和焦点问题。论文基于资源依赖理论和委托代理理论的双重视角,以创业板上市公司为研究对象,采用两阶段最小二乘法,考察了董事会资本对研发投入的影响,以及高管薪酬激励对二者关系的调节作用。实证研究结果显示:(1)董事会资本宽度对企业的研发投入具有显著的正向影响;(2)董事会资本深度对企业的R&D投入具有显著的正向影响;(3)进一步分析发现,高管薪酬激励对董事会资本和研发投入之间的关系具有正向调节作用。
The relationship between Board of Directors’ Capital, Executive Incentive Contract and R & D Investment has always been a hot topic and a focus issue for domestic and foreign scholars. Based on the dual perspectives of resource dependence theory and principal-agent theory, this paper takes GEM as a research object and adopts the two-stage least squares method to investigate the influence of board capital on R & D investment and the regulation of executive compensation incentive effect. The empirical results show that: (1) the capital width of the board of directors has a significant positive impact on R & D investment; (2) the depth of capital of the board of directors has a significant positive impact on R & D investment; (3) Further analysis found that senior executives Compensation incentives have a positive regulatory effect on the relationship between board capital and R & D investment.