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Palestinian rival political factions Fatah and Hamas signed a reconciliation agreement in mid-October in Cairo， marking not only a thaw in their relations， but more importantly， a major step toward reaching the end of a decade-long split between the two major Palestinian political forces.
Promising prospect
Under the agreement， Fatah and Hamas consented to the full functioning of the consensus government in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and agreed to work together on resolving all the problems caused by the internal division. The Palestinian consensus government under Fatah will gain full control of the Gaza Strip， ruled by Hamas to date， by December 1.
The Egypt-brokered agreement is undoubtedly of great importance for the future development of the traumatized nation， as partition has long been one of the major obstacles hindering Palestine’s national development and social progress.
During the past 10 years， people in the Gaza Strip suffered poor living conditions， with high unemployment and shortages of power， basic goods and medical services. Subject to long-standing sanctions by Israel， Hamas-ruled Gaza teetered much of the time on the brink of humanitarian crisis. In the wake of the reconciliation， the situation is expected to improve gradually as restrictions on aid entering Gaza are reduced. According to the agreement， after the Palestinian consensus government takes over the Rafah Border Crossing in southern Gaza， the crossing point between Gaza and Egypt， Egypt will reopen the trade gateway， partly lifting the external blockade on Gaza residents.
The reconciliation of the two major Palestinian factions also creates favor- able conditions for progress in the Middle East peace process， as a united Palestinian Government is more representative and therefore has greater legitimacy in PalestineIsrael peace talks. National reconciliation can help enhance the Palestinian Government’s rule， increasing its domestic influence and ability to fulfi ll commitments it made in negotiations with Israel. Since the Palestinian Government has not had effective control of the Gaza Strip for the past decade， Israel has argued that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas lacked authority over the whole of Palestine. In addition， it will also help Palestine gain international support in the negotiations， as the Palestinians will speak with one voice.
The reconciliation deal is widely welcomed by the international community， the Arab world in particular. In a statement congratulating Palestine， the Arab League hailed the reconciliation as the main guarantee for achieving the Palestinian goals of freedom， independence， ending the Israeli occupation and establishing an independent state within the borders delineated in 1967. Inevitable concession
The Cairo agreement is seen as a hard-earned move halfway toward full reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. Over the past 10 years， the two rivals reached a series of understandings and agreements including the Mecca agreement in 2007， the Cairo deal in 2011 and the Gaza deal in 2014. However， they failed to reach a comprehensive reconciliation due to disagreements on political strategy and security issues.
Fundamentally， the hard-won new progress is rooted in the profound political changes that have occurred during the upheaval in the Middle East since 2011. Hamas gradually lost its traditional patrons and partners during this wave of regional political turbulence and became more and more isolated.
For a long time， Syria and Iran were believed to be major allies of Hamas and its foremost providers of funding and weaponry. However， after the Bashar al-Assad administration became constrained by civil confl ict beginning in 2011， Hamas began to distance itself from Damascus and demonstrate public support for Syrian opposition groups due to its misjudgment of the situation. Consequently， its relations with Iran also cooled， and Hamas eventually landed in the predicament of having lost fi nancial support from both countries.
As a bellwether of the Arab world and a neighbor of the Gaza Strip， Egypt has had a direct infl uence on Hamas rule in Gaza. The Rafah Crossing Point is also Gaza residents’sole passage to the outside world. After Egypt’s regime change in 2012， Hamas began to fully embrace the newly-elected President Mohamed Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood. But after Morsi was ousted by the Egyptian military in 2013， relations between Egypt and Hamas became strained， and the Egyptian Government not only closed Hamas offices in Egypt， but also shut the Rafah crossing， destroyed Hamasbuilt smuggling tunnels connecting Gaza with Egypt， and severed contact with the Palestinian faction. In 2015， an Egyptian court even listed Hamas as a “terrorist”group. The two sides’ icy relations further undermined Hamas’ authority in Gaza， and only after Hamas engaged in security cooperation with Egypt and disengaged itself from the Brotherhood could bilateral ties start to improve gradually.
In the Arab world， Qatar is one of Hamas’few supporters. In 2012， Qatar’s Emir Hamad Bin Kahlifa al-Thani visited Gaza and promised a large amount of fi nancial support. He was also the fi rst foreign head of state to visit Gaza after Hamas took control of the area. However， Qatar’s maverick foreign policy incurred the discontent of other Arab states. Saudi Arabia terminated its diplomatic relations with Qatar， stating as one of the major preconditions for their resumption that Qatar would have to discontinue its support for Hamas. The Qatar diplomatic crisis also directly increased the pressure on Hamas. In the meantime， the Palestinian faction’s arch enemy Israel has strengthened its clamp down. The turbulence in the Arab world since 2011 has provided Israel with an opportunity to expand its regional influence. In the past several years， Tel Aviv has continually increased its blockade on the Gaza Strip and attacks on Hamas. Operation Protective Edge， launched by Israel in Gaza in July 2014， killed more than 1，000 Palestinian citizens and injured tens of thousands of others. The operation has also caused huge damage to the Gaza Strip’s infrastructure， worsening the local economy and people’s livelihoods.
Challenges remain
The return of Hamas to the reconciliation process with Fatah is a bow to necessity， which means the accord between the two rival groups is not built on the basis of full mutual trust. Thus， it is to be expected that Hamas will continue to be an independent political force in Palestine， instead of being subsumed by Fatah， and competition between the two factions will continue.
Whether Hamas should retain its combat capability is another concern for the reconciliation. Hamas controls a well-armed military force which cannot be ignored and has no desire to give up its battle against Israel or place itself under Abbas’ command. It is also difficult for Fatah to accept the coexistence of two separate military forces within Palestine.
Israel has declared that it will not recognize the unified Fatah-Hamas Palestinian Government unless Hamas disarms and stops calling for Israel’s destruction. The United States has also expected the emerging Palestinian Government to recognize Israel and disarm Hamas. In response， however， Hamas has stated that “no one” can force it to disarm or recognize Israel.
The Palestinian problem has never been an issue that solely concerns Palestine， or Palestine and Israel， as it involves the interests of many regional states and outside powers. From this perspective， the political reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah is a key step toward settlement of the problem， but is far from being the fi nal step.
Promising prospect
Under the agreement， Fatah and Hamas consented to the full functioning of the consensus government in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and agreed to work together on resolving all the problems caused by the internal division. The Palestinian consensus government under Fatah will gain full control of the Gaza Strip， ruled by Hamas to date， by December 1.
The Egypt-brokered agreement is undoubtedly of great importance for the future development of the traumatized nation， as partition has long been one of the major obstacles hindering Palestine’s national development and social progress.
During the past 10 years， people in the Gaza Strip suffered poor living conditions， with high unemployment and shortages of power， basic goods and medical services. Subject to long-standing sanctions by Israel， Hamas-ruled Gaza teetered much of the time on the brink of humanitarian crisis. In the wake of the reconciliation， the situation is expected to improve gradually as restrictions on aid entering Gaza are reduced. According to the agreement， after the Palestinian consensus government takes over the Rafah Border Crossing in southern Gaza， the crossing point between Gaza and Egypt， Egypt will reopen the trade gateway， partly lifting the external blockade on Gaza residents.
The reconciliation of the two major Palestinian factions also creates favor- able conditions for progress in the Middle East peace process， as a united Palestinian Government is more representative and therefore has greater legitimacy in PalestineIsrael peace talks. National reconciliation can help enhance the Palestinian Government’s rule， increasing its domestic influence and ability to fulfi ll commitments it made in negotiations with Israel. Since the Palestinian Government has not had effective control of the Gaza Strip for the past decade， Israel has argued that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas lacked authority over the whole of Palestine. In addition， it will also help Palestine gain international support in the negotiations， as the Palestinians will speak with one voice.
The reconciliation deal is widely welcomed by the international community， the Arab world in particular. In a statement congratulating Palestine， the Arab League hailed the reconciliation as the main guarantee for achieving the Palestinian goals of freedom， independence， ending the Israeli occupation and establishing an independent state within the borders delineated in 1967. Inevitable concession
The Cairo agreement is seen as a hard-earned move halfway toward full reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. Over the past 10 years， the two rivals reached a series of understandings and agreements including the Mecca agreement in 2007， the Cairo deal in 2011 and the Gaza deal in 2014. However， they failed to reach a comprehensive reconciliation due to disagreements on political strategy and security issues.
Fundamentally， the hard-won new progress is rooted in the profound political changes that have occurred during the upheaval in the Middle East since 2011. Hamas gradually lost its traditional patrons and partners during this wave of regional political turbulence and became more and more isolated.
For a long time， Syria and Iran were believed to be major allies of Hamas and its foremost providers of funding and weaponry. However， after the Bashar al-Assad administration became constrained by civil confl ict beginning in 2011， Hamas began to distance itself from Damascus and demonstrate public support for Syrian opposition groups due to its misjudgment of the situation. Consequently， its relations with Iran also cooled， and Hamas eventually landed in the predicament of having lost fi nancial support from both countries.
As a bellwether of the Arab world and a neighbor of the Gaza Strip， Egypt has had a direct infl uence on Hamas rule in Gaza. The Rafah Crossing Point is also Gaza residents’sole passage to the outside world. After Egypt’s regime change in 2012， Hamas began to fully embrace the newly-elected President Mohamed Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood. But after Morsi was ousted by the Egyptian military in 2013， relations between Egypt and Hamas became strained， and the Egyptian Government not only closed Hamas offices in Egypt， but also shut the Rafah crossing， destroyed Hamasbuilt smuggling tunnels connecting Gaza with Egypt， and severed contact with the Palestinian faction. In 2015， an Egyptian court even listed Hamas as a “terrorist”group. The two sides’ icy relations further undermined Hamas’ authority in Gaza， and only after Hamas engaged in security cooperation with Egypt and disengaged itself from the Brotherhood could bilateral ties start to improve gradually.
In the Arab world， Qatar is one of Hamas’few supporters. In 2012， Qatar’s Emir Hamad Bin Kahlifa al-Thani visited Gaza and promised a large amount of fi nancial support. He was also the fi rst foreign head of state to visit Gaza after Hamas took control of the area. However， Qatar’s maverick foreign policy incurred the discontent of other Arab states. Saudi Arabia terminated its diplomatic relations with Qatar， stating as one of the major preconditions for their resumption that Qatar would have to discontinue its support for Hamas. The Qatar diplomatic crisis also directly increased the pressure on Hamas. In the meantime， the Palestinian faction’s arch enemy Israel has strengthened its clamp down. The turbulence in the Arab world since 2011 has provided Israel with an opportunity to expand its regional influence. In the past several years， Tel Aviv has continually increased its blockade on the Gaza Strip and attacks on Hamas. Operation Protective Edge， launched by Israel in Gaza in July 2014， killed more than 1，000 Palestinian citizens and injured tens of thousands of others. The operation has also caused huge damage to the Gaza Strip’s infrastructure， worsening the local economy and people’s livelihoods.
Challenges remain
The return of Hamas to the reconciliation process with Fatah is a bow to necessity， which means the accord between the two rival groups is not built on the basis of full mutual trust. Thus， it is to be expected that Hamas will continue to be an independent political force in Palestine， instead of being subsumed by Fatah， and competition between the two factions will continue.
Whether Hamas should retain its combat capability is another concern for the reconciliation. Hamas controls a well-armed military force which cannot be ignored and has no desire to give up its battle against Israel or place itself under Abbas’ command. It is also difficult for Fatah to accept the coexistence of two separate military forces within Palestine.
Israel has declared that it will not recognize the unified Fatah-Hamas Palestinian Government unless Hamas disarms and stops calling for Israel’s destruction. The United States has also expected the emerging Palestinian Government to recognize Israel and disarm Hamas. In response， however， Hamas has stated that “no one” can force it to disarm or recognize Israel.
The Palestinian problem has never been an issue that solely concerns Palestine， or Palestine and Israel， as it involves the interests of many regional states and outside powers. From this perspective， the political reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah is a key step toward settlement of the problem， but is far from being the fi nal step.