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探讨中国房地产调控政策的实施效率及未来的制度设计。构建包含地方政府与中央政府的不完全信息重复博弈模型,分析中国房地产调控政策博弈的演化过程,结果表明,与单期博弈不同,重复博弈均衡并非一成不变,而是一个依赖博弈双方持有信念及策略收益的动态过程;在房市施行“分类调控”的新常态下,进一步借助激励理论探讨中央政府如何通过制度设计来兼顾多元化目标并应对委托代理带来的逆向选择和道德风险问题。研究发现,通过构建一组以房地产价格和经济增长为信号的随机契约,中央政府可以在兼顾经济增长和调控房地产价格的同时提高政策效力。
Discuss the implementation efficiency of China’s real estate regulation and control policies and the design of the future system. The game model of incomplete information between local governments and the central government is constructed to analyze the evolutionary process of China’s real estate regulation and control policy. The results show that, unlike the one-period game, the repeated game equilibrium is not invariable, but a reliance on the holding belief of both parties and Strategy of income dynamic process; under the new normal of housing market implementation of “classification and control ”, to further stimulate the theory to explore how the central government through system design to take into account the diversity of targets and deal with adverse selection and moral hazard brought by the principal-agent. The study found that by constructing a set of random contracts based on real estate prices and economic growth, the central government can make policy more effective while taking into account economic growth and real estate prices.