国有创投在实践中能否真正地发挥引导作用?现有文献对此存在广泛争议。文章首先从机理上明确了国有创投能否发挥引导作用依赖于其先行投资的试错和信号传递功能,即鉴证效应,因而其微观表现应当是投资序列中国有创投与民营创投的“先行-跟进”关系。然后,文章使用标的为非上市企业的投资序列样本,实证检验了我国国有创投的引导作用。结果显示,在投资序列中,国有创投的介入相对较晚,且国有创投以主投方式介入时,民营创投后期参与的概率会降低,这表明国有创投的引导作用尚未得到有效发挥。进一步的原因分析表明,代理问题使得国有创投投资人缺乏履行引导职能的动力,而目标管理不足和资源支持不当是导致该问题的重要管理因素。 Can state-owned venture capital actually play a guiding role in practice? There is a wide range of controversies in the existing literature. First of all, the article clearly clarifies whether the state-owned venture capital can play a guiding role depending on the trial-and-error and signaling function of its first investment, that is, the forensic effect. Therefore, the micro-performance of the state-owned venture capital should be the investment sequence of China’s venture capital and private venture capital “Go ahead - follow up” relationship. Then, the article uses the sample of investment sequence, which is marked as non-listed companies, and empirically tests the guiding role of state-owned venture capital in our country. The results show that in the investment sequence, the involvement of state-owned venture capitalists is relatively late, and the probability of participation of state-owned venture capital firms in the latter part of the venture capital market will decrease as the state-owned venture capitalists adopt the main investment approach, indicating that the guiding role of state venture capital funds has not yet been effectively played . Further analysis of the reasons shows that the agency problem makes the state-owned venture capital investors lack the motivation to perform the guiding function, and the lack of targeted management and improper resource support are the important management factors of the problem.