作为最古老的哲学思考之一,尽管人们通常习惯于对人格同一性问题采用第三人称外部标准,或者持有宗教信念的人对其探讨也暗中预设一个不可还原论的“灵魂”。从而使问题变得无可辩驳。然而,由洛克奠定的第一人称记忆标准,经由巴特勒、雷德、休谟,直到以威廉姆斯和帕菲特为代表的当代分析哲学家的还原论进路,实际上构成了西方哲学家对该问题讨论的主流。这一进路在帕菲特那里达成了对人格同一性的问题消解,而它的背后却蕴含着旨在批判古典利已主义的目的论导向。本文工作仅限于按照还原论的内在逻辑来勾勒出这一进路的演进及其争论的内在关联。 As one of the oldest philosophical thinking, although people are usually accustomed to adopt the third-person external standard on the issue of personality identity, or who hold the religious belief to explore it, it implicitly presupposes an irreversible “soul.” Thus making the issue irrefutable. However, the first-person memory standard laid down by Locke through Butler, Reid and Hume, until the reductionist approach of contemporary analytical philosophers represented by Williams and Parfit, actually constituted a The issue is discussed in the mainstream. This approach resolves the problem of personality identity in Parfit, but behind it lies the teleological guidance that aims to criticize classical philosophical altruism. The work in this paper is limited to the inherent relationship between the evolution of this approach and its controversy according to the inherent logic of reductionism.