对于银行而言 ,其经营中所面临的道德风险不仅来源于借款企业 ,更重要、更直接的是其信贷人员的“败德行为”问题。我国国有商业银行传统的信贷管理制度未能对信贷人员的代理行为形成有效的约束 ,从而导致了大量银行坏帐的产生。现有的信贷管理制度又过度强调了对风险的防范 ,从而又在很大程度上约束了银行的开拓经营和整个宏观经济的平稳快速发展。本文对此运用契约经济理论分析了我国国有商业银行传统及现有信贷管理制度对信贷人员所做的契约安排及其存在的问题 ,在此基础上尝试性的提出了一种新的制度改进方案 For the banks, the moral hazard they face in the operation not only comes from the borrowing enterprises, but more importantly and directly is the “bad behavior” of their credit officers. The traditional credit management system of the state-owned commercial banks in our country failed to form an effective constraint on the agent behavior of the credit officers, resulting in a large number of bank bad debts. The existing credit management system has overemphasized the precautions against risks, which in turn has largely restrained the bank’s operation and development and the steady and rapid development of the macroeconomy. In this paper, the contractual economic theory is used to analyze the contractual arrangement and existing problems of the credit officers in the traditional and existing credit management systems of state-owned commercial banks in our country. Based on this, a new system improvement plan