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之前的研究发现负债融资阻碍了企业的R&D投资,本文从债权人监督的角度对负债融资与R&D投资之间的关系进行进一步的解释。本文研究发现,受到债权人监督较少的商业信用对企业的R&D投资几乎没有影响,而受到监督较多的银行信贷则严重阻碍了R&D投资。然而,在银行信贷监督较少的国有企业以及自有资金较多的企业中,银行信贷却不会影响企业的R&D投资。本文的研究结果表明,负债融资对R&D投资的影响效果受到债权人监督能力的影响,监督力强的债权人更有能力影响企业的决策,从而导致企业R&D投资的减少,而监督力弱的债权人则不会影响企业的R&D投资。
Earlier studies found that debt financing hindered the R & D investment of enterprises. This article further explains the relationship between debt financing and R & D investment from the perspective of creditor supervision. This study finds that commercial credit, which is subject to less supervision by creditors, has almost no impact on the R & D investment of enterprises, while bank credit, which is subject to more supervision, has seriously hindered R & D investment. However, in state-owned enterprises with less bank credit supervision and those with more self-owned funds, bank credit will not affect the R & D investment of enterprises. The result of this paper shows that the effect of debt financing on R & D investment is influenced by the ability of the creditor to supervise. Creditors with supervisory ability are more capable of influencing the decision-making of the enterprise, resulting in the reduction of R & D investment. However, Will affect the company’s R & D investment.