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在对股权激励过程进行深入分析和提炼的基础上,在假设股票市场有效、股东风险中性、高管人员风险厌恶的条件下,以股东收益最大化为决策目标,建立数学模型、从理论上研究股权激励条件下的上市公司委托-代理关系。研究结果表明,在股权激励条件下,股东给予高管人员的最优股权数量、高管人员的最优努力水平以及股东和高管人员的均衡预期收益将随着高管人员能力水平的提高而增加,随着上市公司所处行业竞争激烈程度和市场环境不确定性程度的提高而减少。论文研究结果在一定程度上揭示了股权激励对上市公司委托-代理关系的影响机理,阐明了上市公司对高管人员的最优股权激励数量和高管人员付出的最优努力水平及其影响因素。
Based on the analysis and refinement of equity incentive process, under the condition of effective stock market, neutral risk of shareholders and risk aversion of senior executives, a mathematical model is established based on the maximization of shareholders’ return, and theoretically Research on the Principal-Agent Relationship of Listed Companies under Equity Incentives. The results show that under the condition of equity incentive, the optimal shareholding given to senior managers by shareholders, the optimal level of senior executives ’efforts and the balanced expected return of shareholders and senior executives will increase with the improvement of senior executives’ ability level Increase, with the listed companies in the highly competitive industries and the degree of uncertainty of the market environment and reduce. To some extent, the results of the dissertation reveal the mechanism of the influence of equity incentive on the principal-agent relationship of listed companies, clarify the optimal amount of equity incentive for senior executives and the optimal level of executives and their influencing factors .