海德格尔在《康德书》中将先验想象力解释为感性与知性的共同根。对共同根的关注实际上在18世纪心理学关于力的多元论和一元论的持久争论中就有其渊源。康德反对力的一元论,并提出了一种可以称为“内主体目的论”的策略来协调感性与知性两种能力,以实现主体性的统一。康德之后的德国唯心论的根本前提和动机也正在于,从诸种知识能力的结构统一中来寻找主体的统一性。就此,他们抛弃了康德对人类知识能力所作的限制,通过绝对自我的建构而将想象力与共同根结合在一起。这可以说已经是《康德书》的先声了。而新康德主义者面对《康德书》之所以无力反驳,恰恰是因为他们对此问题史背景知之甚少。但《康德书》却自觉地走在与德国唯心论不同的道路上,它的独特之处并不在于将共同根确定为一个单一的想象力,而在于试图以诸要素的同等源初性这样一个在海德格尔哲学中起着支配作用的思路来达到主体性的统一。 Heidegger interprets transcendental imagination in Kant’s book as the common root of sensibility and intellect. The concern for the common root actually has its roots in the protracted debate in psychology about power pluralism and monism in the eighteenth century. Kantian monism, and put forward a strategy that can be called “inner subject teleology ” to coordinate the two capabilities of sensibility and intellectuality in order to achieve the unity of subjectivity. The fundamental premise and motivation of German idealism after Kant also lie in the search for the unity of the subject from the structural unification of various kinds of knowledge and abilities. In this regard, they abandoned Kant’s restrictions on human knowledge and ability and combined imagination with a common root through the construction of absolute self. This can be said to have been the forerunner of Kant’s book. However, the reason why the neo-Kantians faced Kant’s book was unable to refute it precisely because they knew little about the historical background of the question. But Kant’s book is consciously walking on a different path from that of German idealism. Its uniqueness lies not in defining the common root as a single imagination, but in trying to begin with the same origin of the various elements A thought that plays a dominant role in Heidegger’s philosophy achieves subjectivity.