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IPO效率一直是学术界研究的热点问题,但没有IPO模式与效率关系的专门研究。文献资料显示I,PO本质是一种制度的安排,是一种博弈现象。通过分析IPO模式演化历程的特点,结合我国股市情况,提出基于IPO模式中散户数量与效率对应关系展开博弈研究的新思路,根据参与约束、激励约束的条件,建立理论模型,展开博弈分析。结果发现:完全排除散户的IPO模式效率最差;散户完全参与的IPO模式具有pareto最佳效率;散户有限参与的IPO模式效率介于这两者之间。依据博弈分析结论,为从体制上保障IPO模式的效率,提出消除承销商等中间环节,建立上市公司与投资者直接沟通的市场化机制构想。
IPO efficiency has always been a hot issue in academic research, but there is no special study on the relationship between IPO mode and efficiency. Literature data show that I, PO essence is a kind of institutional arrangements, is a game phenomenon. By analyzing the characteristics of the evolution of IPO model and combining with the situation of China’s stock market, this paper proposes a new game theory based on the relationship between the number of retail investors and the efficiency of IPO. Based on the conditions of participation constraint and incentive constraint, a theoretical model is established and a game analysis is conducted. The result shows that the IPO model with complete exclusion of retail investors has the poorest efficiency, the IPO model with full participation of retail investors has the best pareto efficiency, and the IPO model with limited participation of retail investors has efficiency between the two. According to the conclusion of the game analysis, in order to safeguard the efficiency of the IPO mode systematically, this paper puts forward the idea of eliminating the intermediate links such as the underwriters and establishing the market mechanism of the direct communication between the listed company and the investors.