在现有的允许需求侧竞标的日前联营市场中,每当某个时段的市场清算电价高于投标报价时,需求侧的兆瓦级购电竞标就被拒绝。由于用户不参与通过削减供电量来牟利的商业运作,因此未得到满足的用户需求只能从平衡市场中在更接近于预期用电的时段中获得。这就使用户遭受更大的不能以所希望的价格来满足其对电能的需要的风险。文章介绍了一种新的市场概念,它能在日前市场对需求侧的竞标者关闭后,以合并拍卖规则中需求移动机制的方法来降低其需求不平衡的风险。 In the existing joint-stock market that allows the demand-side bidding, the demand-side megawatt purchase bid is rejected every time the market clearing price is higher than the bid price. Since users are not involved in commercial operations that profit by reducing power supply, unmet user needs can only be obtained from a balanced market over a period that is closer to expected power usage. This exposes users to a greater risk of not being able to meet their power needs at the desired price. The article introduces a new concept of market that reduces the risk of an imbalance in demand by merging the demand-moving mechanisms in the auction rules after the market closes the demand-side bidders.