论文部分内容阅读
股权分置改革后全流通的市场环境为我们从非控股大股东减持的视角来考察股东与管理者之间的代理问题以及大股东与中小投资者之间的代理问题提供了机会。以2005—2014年沪深上市公司为样本进行实证检验后发现:非控股大股东“用脚投票”有助于降低控股股东代理成本和管理者代理成本;控股股东在持股比较低时侵占上市公司利益更严重,但国有企业控股股东持股比越大,对上市公司的利益侵占越严重,同时,国有企业的管理者代理成本更高;非国有企业控股股东同样存在严重的侵占上市公司利益的行为。
After the non-tradable share reform, the full circulation of the market environment provides an opportunity for us to examine the agency problem between shareholders and managers and the agency problem between the major shareholders and small and medium-sized investors from the perspective of the reduction of non-controlling major shareholders. According to the empirical test of the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2005 to 2014, it is found that the non-controlling majority shareholder ’s “voting with his feet ” helps to reduce the controlling shareholder’s agency cost and agency agency cost. When the controlling shareholder has a low shareholding ratio The interests of listed companies are more serious. However, the larger the shareholding ratio of controlling shareholders in state-owned enterprises, the more serious the appropriation of the interests of listed companies. At the same time, the cost of agency of state-owned enterprises is even higher. Controlling shareholders of non-state-owned enterprises also have serious misappropriation and listing The interests of the company.