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随着新维特根斯坦派的兴起,《逻辑哲学论》中的“无意义”问题在维特根斯坦哲学思想的诠释者中引起了激烈的争论。新派颠覆了正统的诠释,认为无意义的句子的产生不是对逻辑句法规则的违背,而是由于句子的构成部分的意谓的缺乏,并且由此得出了只有一种无意义,那就是纯粹的无意义。文章在系统分析两派观点的基础上,认为这两种诠释路径的实质是自弗雷格以来的语境原则与构成性原则冲突的一种体现,只有将两者融贯为一体才能正确地理解维特根斯坦的哲学思想。
With the rise of the new Wittgenstein, the issue of “meaninglessness ” in Logical Philosophicalus has caused heated debates among the interpreters of Wittgenstein’s philosophical thinking. The New School subverts the orthodox interpretation that the generation of meaningless sentences is not a violation of logical syntactic rules but rather a lack of meaning of the constituent parts of the sentence and leads to only one meaninglessness that is pure Meaningless. On the basis of systematic analysis of two viewpoints, the article thinks that the essence of these two kinds of interpretation paths is a manifestation of the conflict between the contextual principle and the constitutive principle since Frege. Only by integrating the two into one can be correct Understand Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Thought.