论文部分内容阅读
通过对唐人神股份有限公司进行累计超额收益以及财务指标分析,发现唐人神股份有限公司的高管存在出于节税目的选择在公司股价处于低位时行权的行为,并伴随有操控信息披露以及盈余管理的行为。在我国民营上市公司所有权与经营权高度集中的情况下,这种机会主义行为更加可能出现,从而使股权激励计划的激励效用降低。对此,建议完善公司治理结构、加大监管力度,并调整股票期权纳税时点以及主要激励对象。
Through the analysis of accumulated excess returns and financial indicators of Tang Shen Shen Co., Ltd., it was found that the executives of Tang Shen Shen Co., Ltd. have the option to exercise their rights when the company’s stock price is low for the purpose of saving tax, accompanied by the disclosure of control information and Earnings management behavior. Under the condition that the ownership and management of private listed companies in our country are highly concentrated, such opportunistic behaviors are more likely to appear, so that the incentive effect of the equity incentive plan is reduced. In this regard, it is recommended to improve the corporate governance structure, increase supervision, and adjust the timing of the stock options tax and the main incentive.