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在现代企业制度中,所有权与经营权相分离,由于信息的不对称,股东需要设计相应的激励机制,促使管理层与股东利益趋于一致。高层管理人员的薪酬激励又往往以企业实现的绩效为依据,而会计政策的选择对会计盈余有很大的影响。于是,高层管理人员可能通过选择会计政策影响会计盈余,实现自身利益的最大化。本文利用企业最新薪酬制度及在新财务制度,分析企业高管层激励如何影响上市公司会计政策选择。
In the modern enterprise system, ownership and management are separated. Due to the asymmetric information, shareholders need to design corresponding incentive mechanisms to promote the convergence of management and shareholder interests. The remuneration incentives of senior managers are often based on the performance achieved by the enterprise, and the choice of accounting policies has a great impact on the accounting earnings. As a result, senior management may maximize its own profit by choosing accounting policies that affect accounting earnings. This article uses the latest remuneration system of the enterprise and the new financial system to analyze how the executive incentive of the enterprise affects the accounting choice of the listed company.