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本文基于高管薪酬管制和放权改革的制度背景,选取2003-2012年中国非金融上市公司为样本,考察高管外部薪酬差距与奢华在职消费的关系,并从权力异化的角度解释高薪未必养廉的逻辑。实证结果表明:(1)高管外部薪酬差距并不能消弭奢华在职消费,该现象并不因公司产权性质的不同而有所差异;(2)高管外部薪酬差距部分是由高管权力导致的;(3)由高管权力导致的高薪进一步加重了奢华在职消费。以上结果说明单纯给予上市公司高管高额薪酬并不能抑制奢华在职消费;权力膨胀可能使得高管在获得高额薪酬的同时追求能够彰显身份地位的在职消费。
Based on the background of executive compensation control and decentralization reform, this paper selects the Chinese non-financial listed companies from 2003 to 2012 as a sample to examine the relationship between executive pay gap and luxury on-the-job consumption, and explains from the perspective of power dissimilation logic. The empirical results show that: (1) The external pay gap of senior executives can not eliminate luxury consumption, which is not due to the nature of the company’s property rights; (2) The external pay gap is partly caused by the power of senior executives ; (3) The high salary caused by the power of senior executives further aggravated the luxury on-the-job consumption. The above results show that simply giving high-paid executives of listed companies can not restrain the luxury on-the-job consumption. The expansion of power may enable executives to pursue on-the-job consumption that can reveal their status while obtaining high salary.