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为建立和维持良好的审计声誉,事务所有动机提供高质量的审计服务,这种主观上的自利行为客观上降低了投资者和管理层之间的信息不对称,间接保护了投资者。本文以2001年至2009年A股上市公司的7740个数据为样本,研究了事务所声誉和投资者保护之间的关系。结果发现,四大更纵容管理层进行业务操纵;而客户组合中ST、*ST和亏损公司比例高的事务所仅能抑制管理层的费用操纵。也就是说,高声誉的事务所并不必然对投资者的保护高。
In order to establish and maintain a good audit reputation, the firm has all motives to provide high-quality audit services. This subjective self-interest objectively reduces information asymmetry between investors and management and indirectly protects investors. Based on a sample of 7,740 A-share listed companies from 2001 to 2009, this paper examines the relationship between firm reputation and investor protection. The results show that the four major management operations more tolerant to business; and client portfolio ST, * ST and loss-making companies with a high percentage of firms can only inhibit the cost of management. In other words, high-reputation firms do not necessarily have high investor protection.