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本文分别在随机需求和确定需求条件下,研究了零售商采用FS公平偏好模型和BO公平偏好模型时零售商公平偏好行为对最优订货量、零售价格、供应商利润、零售商利润和供应链协调性的影响。研究得出,批发价格契约不能实现确定需求条件下的供应链协调,但是却能够协调随机需求条件下的供应链,且当需求为确定的线性需求函数时,无论零售商的公平偏好强度如何,供应链的总利润都不改变,零售商的公平偏好行为仅改变了供应链成员之间的利润分配,从而起到渠道利润分配机制的作用。此外,零售商倾向于采用FS公平偏好模型,而供应商希望零售商选择BO公平偏好模型。
In this paper, under the conditions of stochastic demand and demand determination respectively, the retailer’s fair preference behavior and the fairness preferences of the retailer adopting the FS fairness preference model and the BO fairness preference model are analyzed. The optimal order quantity, retail price, supplier profit, retailer profit and supply chain The impact of coordination. The research shows that the wholesale price contract can not achieve the supply chain coordination under the condition of definite demand, but it can coordinate the supply chain under the condition of stochastic demand. When the demand is a deterministic linear demand function, regardless of the retainer’s fair preference intensity, The total profit of the supply chain does not change. The retailer’s fair preference behavior only changes the profit distribution among the members of the supply chain, thus playing the role of channel profit distribution mechanism. In addition, retailers tend to adopt the FS fairness preference model, while suppliers want retailers to choose the BO fairness preference model.