论文部分内容阅读
D&O保险是公司治理与风险管理模式中新生的制衡点。近年来分析独立董事制度或董事会特征与上市公司违规行为的例子出现了较多,但是有关购买此类保险对公司管理层行为的影响及其经济后果的研究却较为缺乏。本文的特点在于,将在我国发展较为缓慢的D&Q保险制度,与一个我们讨论已久的上市公司违规问题结合起来,分析这种制度是否有效以及怎样创造环境发挥其有效性。
D & O insurance is a rebalancing point between corporate governance and risk management models. In recent years, there have been many examples of analyzing the characteristics of independent directors or the characteristics of the board of directors and listed companies, but there is a lack of research on the impact of purchasing such insurance on the management behavior of the company and its economic consequences. The characteristic of this paper is to combine the relatively slow D & Q insurance system in our country with a problem we have been discussing for a long time, and to analyze whether such a system is effective and how to create an environment for its effectiveness.