中国的规制政府是在经济转型过程中崛起的。这一特殊历史背景使得关于规制的公共利益理论、公共选择理论、新比较经济学和制度移植论对其崛起逻辑的解释都值得商榷。事实上,中国的规制政府是中央政府考虑不同利益集团约束和外部竞争压力前提下,根据自己的信念和认知能力,对原有治理制度进行边际改进的一个供给主导型过程。该过程的路径依赖特征既是引发规制失灵的根本原因,也为提高规制效率提供了改革思路。 China’s regulatory government is in the process of economic restructuring. This particular historical background makes the theory of public interest on regulation, the theory of public choice, the new comparative economics and the theory of system transplantations all worthy of debate about its rise logic. In fact, China’s regulated government is a supply-driven process whereby the central government marginally improves its existing governance system based on its own beliefs and cognitive abilities, taking into account the constraints of different interest groups and the pressure of external competition. The path-dependent features of the process not only trigger the root causes of regulatory failure, but also provide reform ideas for improving regulatory efficiency.