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委托代理理论是现代公司治理体系的重要起点,而薪酬契约又是委托代理理论的重要组成部分,其中关于高管薪酬的研究则一直是公司治理的热点。关联交易是上市公司重要而且普遍的经济活动,对企业发展影响深远,一方面可以充分利用企业资源来降低交易成本,另一方面,大股东通过较低的交易价格或者交易信息的不对称形成非公允关联交易,从而侵害中小股东的利益或者达到自身掏空企业的目的。高管薪酬和关联交易是如何同时影响企业价值的,高管薪酬和关联交易之间又是什么样的关系。本文就10年到15年创业板上市公司的数据进行相关研究。实证结果表明,高管薪酬和关联交易成负相关关系,关联交易和企业价值成负相关关系,而高管薪酬和企业价值成正相关关系。最后根据回归结果,分析问题并得出结论。
Principal-agent theory is an important starting point of the modern corporate governance system, and the contract of pay is an important part of principal-agent theory. The research on executive compensation has always been a hot topic in corporate governance. Related party transactions are important and common economic activities of listed companies and have far-reaching impact on the development of enterprises. On the one hand, they can make full use of enterprise resources to reduce transaction costs. On the other hand, large shareholders form non-symmetrical transactions through lower transaction prices or transaction information Fair related party transactions, thus infringing on the interests of minority shareholders or to achieve their own tunneling business purposes. How executive pay and related party transactions affect corporate value at the same time, what is the relationship between executive compensation and related party transactions. This article conducts relevant research on the data of GEM listed companies from 10 to 15 years. Empirical results show that there is a negative correlation between executive compensation and related party transactions, and there is a negative correlation between connected party transactions and corporate value, while executive compensation and corporate value have a positive correlation. Finally, based on the regression results, analyze the problem and draw conclusions.