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“寻租”是指维护既得的经济利益或是对既得利益进行再分配的非生产性活动。寻租活动常常表现为两个或多个寻租者为争夺租金而展开竞争的博弈过程。文章对寻租活动进行博弈分析,证明当寻担博弈达到纳什均衡时,寻租者的寻租成本支出之和与寻租者的人数和租金的规模呈正相关关系。即寻租者越多,租金规模越大,寻租成本越高。从直观上看,治理军费分配中的“寻租”活动,减小军费的流失可以通过两个途径解决:一是缩短军费分配链,以减少“寻租者”数量;二是减少使有权主体和分配标准不明确的经费的规模,以减少军费分配中的“租金”规模。
“Rent-seeking” refers to non-productive activities that preserve vested economic interests or redistribute vested interests. Rent-seeking activity often manifests itself in the game of two or more rent-seeking players competing for rent. The article analyzes the rent-seeking activities by game theory, and proves that the sum of the rent-seeking costs of rent-seekers is positively correlated with the number of rent-seekers and the size of rent when the seeking game reaches Nash equilibrium. That is, the more rent-seekers, the greater the rent, the higher rent-seeking costs. Intuitively, the “rent-seeking” activities in the management of the distribution of military expenditures and the reduction of the loss of military expenditures can be solved in two ways: one is to shorten the distribution chain of military expenditures so as to reduce the number of “rent-seekers”; the other is to reduce the number of “ The size of the main body and the allocation of ambiguous funding standards to reduce the size of the ”rent" in the distribution of military expenditures.