许多情况下 ,政府通过数量管制而非税收来控制不符合其意愿行为 ,而大部分经济学家认为 ,税收是优于数量管制的。我们试图从政策执行成本的角度为这一矛盾提供解释。通过引入私人执行者 ,我们证明出 ,尽管数量管制限制了一部分对社会而言有效率的行为 ,但是其较低的违规行为调查成本能够加强政策执行力度与整体效率 In many cases, the government controls the behavior that does not meet its wishes through quantitative control rather than taxation, and most economists believe that taxation is superior to quantitative regulation. We try to explain this paradox from the perspective of the cost of implementing the policy. By introducing private performers, we show that although quantitative controls limit a portion of socially-efficient conduct, the lower costs of non-compliance investigations can enhance policy enforcement and overall efficiency