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构建考虑顾客策略行为的两周期供应链博弈模型,分析分散式和集中式决策下,供应链成员的最优决策及顾客策略行为强度对各成员企业决策和利润的影响,研究两部定价契约和数量折扣契约的协调问题,提出一个基于成员议价能力的利润分配机制,并探讨顾客策略行为和成员议价能力对最优补偿金额的影响.主要结论为:1)顾客策略性越强,对供应链成员和总利润的负效应越大,且存在一个阈值,超过此阈值后,供应链各成员利润和总利润均降至最低限,但供应商利润总是高于零售商;2)两部定价契约和数量折扣契约能实现上述供应链的协调,但总有一参与方独占整个供应链的利润;3)基于成员议价能力的利润分配机制下,最优补偿金额与补偿提供方的议价能力负相关,顾客策略行为将导致补偿金额的降低.
This paper constructs a two-period supply chain game model that considers the customer’s strategic behavior, analyzes the influence of the optimal decision-making of the supply chain members and customer strategic behavior intensity on the decision-making and profit of the member enterprises under the decentralized and centralized decision-making, Quantity discount contract, a profit distribution mechanism based on member bargaining power is proposed, and the effect of customer strategy behavior and member bargaining power on the optimal compensation amount is discussed.The main conclusions are as follows: 1) The stronger the customer strategy, The greater the negative effect of membership and total profit, and there is a threshold beyond which the profit of each member and the total profit of the supply chain are reduced to a minimum, but the supplier profit is always higher than that of the retailer. 2) Two pricing Contracts and quantity discount contracts can achieve the coordination of the supply chain, but there is always a party monopoly profits of the entire supply chain; 3) under the profit distribution mechanism of member bargaining power, the optimal compensation amount is negatively related to the bargaining power of compensation providers , Customer strategy will lead to a reduction in the amount of compensation.