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本文以2007~2015年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,基于资本市场的业绩预期压力对企业投资不足的影响,探讨高管股权激励对该影响的治理效应,以及发挥治理作用的具体股权激励类型。研究发现:(1)业绩预期压力的增大会加剧企业投资不足;(2)高管股权激励能够缓解业绩预期压力带来的投资不足;(3)相对于限制性股票和激励型股权激励,股票期权与福利型股权激励对业绩预期压力引起投资不足的缓解作用更强。
Based on the sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2015, this paper, based on the expected impact of capital market performance on the underinvestment of enterprises, explores the governance effects of executive incentive on the impact and the types of specific equity incentives that play a governance role . The findings are as follows: (1) The increase of expected performance pressure will exacerbate the underinvestment of enterprises; (2) The senior executives’ equity incentive can alleviate the underinvestment caused by the expected performance pressure; (3) Compared with restricted stock and incentive stock incentive, Options and welfare-type equity incentives for the performance of the expected pressure caused by the lack of investment to alleviate the role of more.