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采用2010—2014年可获得信息的2 363家沪深两市A股上市的非金融公司,共计9 751个观测值组成的非平衡面板数据,从委托代理视角推演控股股东两权分离度与公司债务期限结构的关系,并运用最小二乘法(OLS)和两阶段最小二乘法(2SLS)进行实证检验。研究发现,控股股东两权分离度与公司债务期限结构呈显著正相关关系。由此,本文认为控股股东的现金流权与控制权分离程度越大,选择长期债务规避债权人监督的可能性越大。
Based on the unbalanced panel data of 9 751 observations from 2 363 A-share listed non-financial companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges with available information from 2010 to 2014, this paper deduces the relationship between the separation of ownership of two controlling shareholders and the company from the perspective of principal-agent. Debt maturity structure of the relationship between the use of least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) empirical test. The study found that the separation of controlling shareholder’s rights and the company’s debt maturity structure was a significant positive correlation. Therefore, the author believes that the greater the separation of cash flow rights and control rights of controlling shareholders, the greater the possibility of choosing long-term debt to evade the supervision of creditors.