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将基金经理人对违规处罚的认知偏差引入演化博弈分析过程,构建了基金市场内生秩序的演化博弈模型,用于基金经理人追求长期发展和短期逐利行为选择的分析。结果表明,基金经理人追求长期发展需要满足两类条件,而这些条件的达成受到基金经理人长期发展成本、认知偏差系数、违规处罚风险及投资者“回购异象”四个直接因素和投资者强化自我保护意识成本及基金经理人违规被查概率两个间接因素的影响,但是在现实中这些条件较难满足,从而导致了基金经理人的短期行为。解释了基金经理人为追求短期利益而违规操作屡禁不止的原因,并提出了提高查处频率、加大基金经理人违规处罚力度、加强投资者教育等建议。
This paper introduces the cognitive bias of fund managers to the evolutionary game analysis process and constructs the evolutionary game model of endogenous order in the fund market for the analysis of fund managers’ long-term development and short-term profit-making choice. The result shows that the fund manager needs to satisfy two kinds of conditions in the pursuit of long-term development, and the fulfillment of these conditions is affected by the direct development of fund manager, long-term development cost, cognitive deviation coefficient, risk of non-compliance penalty and investors “repurchasing visions ” Factors and investors ’self-protection awareness costs and fund managers’ probability of being investigated are indirectly affected by two indirect factors. However, in reality, these conditions are more difficult to meet, resulting in the short-term behavior of fund managers. Explain the reason why fund managers repeatedly violate regulations in pursuit of short-term interests, and put forward some suggestions to improve the frequency of investigation and punishment, intensify the non-compliance penalties of fund managers and strengthen investor education.