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胡塞尔为建立一门科学之科学的先天本质科学,致力于逻辑学的非心理学化,以纯化观念领域。这时他倾向于柏拉图主义,否定逻辑观念对一切主观性行为的依赖,而这与他所追求的观念之明证性相矛盾,在他看来,明证性即意味着内在主观性。这种紧张并未随《逻辑研究》第二卷的出版而消失,反而加剧了。他一方面以意向相关性来填平意识对象与意识活动之间的对立;另一方面,由于他把这种相关性限定于内在直观范围内,而不敢做超越性构造,这种对立不仅未被填平,反而成为鸿沟。只有当他摆脱心理学主体性,通过先验还原进达先验主体性领域后,这种内在紧张性才得以解决。
Husserl, in order to establish a science of innate nature science of science, dedicated to the non-psychology of logic to purify the concept of the field. At this time, he preferred Platonism and negated the dependence of logical concepts on all subjective behaviors, contradicting the demonstrative nature of the concept he pursued. In his view, demonstrativeness meant inner subjectivity. This tension has not disappeared with the publication of the second volume of “Logic Studies,” but intensified. On the one hand, he flattens the opposition between the object of consciousness and the activity of consciousness by the relevance of intention; on the other hand, because he confines this correlation to the scope of inner intuition and does not dare to do transcendental construction, this opposition is not only Not filled, but become a gulf. Only when he gets rid of the subjectivity of psychology and reaches the transcendental subjectivity through transcendental restoration, can such internal tensions be resolved.