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环境污染问题和经济发展问题向来就是一对冤家,冤家应解不应结。国家虽积极治理环境污染问题,但一些地方政府仍为追求经济效益而执行宽松的环境执法政策,从而出现了环境执法中的“竞次”现象,导致环境问题得不到较大的改善。环境执法竞次现象是指在环境执法领域为发展经济以牺牲环境为代价而造成的执法能力“软”、“弱”的现象。在压力型政治体制的影响下,地方政府因各自的利益低标准博弈以及环境执法的法律制度不完善等原因下,我国出现了一系列诸如怠于执行有关法律法规、虚假环评、土政策为污染企业开绿灯、假“挂牌督办”等环境执法竞次现象,笔者认为应采取通过转变政治激励模式等方法尽力消除“压力型”政治体制的负面影响、通过内外部监督方式完善环境执法行政权的监督等措施予以应对。
Environmental pollution and economic development has always been a pair of friends, friends should not solve the knot. Although the state actively controls the issue of environmental pollution, some local governments still enforce lenient environmental law enforcement policies in pursuit of economic benefits, resulting in “competition ” in environmental law enforcement, resulting in no major improvement in environmental issues . The phenomenon of environmental law enforcement competing refers to the phenomena of “soft” and “weak” law enforcement capacity for the sake of economic development at the expense of environment in the field of environmental law enforcement. Under the influence of the pressure-type political system, local governments have a series of problems such as lazy implementation of relevant laws and regulations, fake EIA and pollution of local policies due to low standard game of their respective interests and imperfect legal system of environmental enforcement. Enterprises should take measures such as changing the mode of political encouragement and try their best to eliminate the negative influence of the “pressure-type” political system and improve the environmental law enforcement through internal and external supervision methods Administrative supervision and other measures to deal with.