论文部分内容阅读
法律的全球化理论存在缺陷,但法律的全球趋同现象客观存在且值得研究。从制度经济学角度考察,作为一种制度变迁,法律全球趋同主要动因来自于其他经济社会条件变化所引发的制度非均衡,以及各国政府受到制度变迁对经济发展的巨大推动作用和制度仿效的低廉成本的双重诱致,而做出的制度仿效的行为选择。当代法律全球趋同的路径选择并非单一,以一定的标准对不同路径进行分类分析具有实践意义和理论意义。我们选择国家及其代表政府为主要的变迁主体,以国家和政府是否有意推动趋同为标准,将法律的全球趋同路径分为主动趋同和被动趋同进行分类比较,发现主动趋同可以大量降低跨国经济活动的交易成本,但移植性趋同的效率受到被移植制度与移植国相关制度适配性的限制,被动趋同虽然并非变迁国家的主动选择,但变迁结果并不一定无效或低效。
The theory of globalization of law is flawed, but the law of global convergence objectively exists and deserves to be studied. From the perspective of institutional economics, as a system change, the main reason of the global convergence of law comes from the disequilibrium of the system brought about by the changes of other economic and social conditions and the tremendous impetus of the governments of various countries to the economic development due to institutional changes and the low imitation of the system The dual inducement of costs, while the system made to follow the behavior of choice. The contemporary path of global convergence of law is not a single choice, with a certain standard of different path classification analysis of practical and theoretical significance. We choose the country and its representative government as the main subjects of change. Based on whether the state and the government intend to promote convergence as the standard, the global convergence path of law is divided into active convergence and passive convergence. We find that active convergence can greatly reduce transnational economic activities However, the efficiency of transplantation convergence is limited by the adaptability of the transplanted system to the system of transplanting countries. Although the passive convergence is not the initiative choice of changing countries, the outcome of the transition is not necessarily ineffective or inefficient.