论文部分内容阅读
本文选取我国2008-2014年沪深两市主板A股上市公司为研究样本,实证研究了分析师跟进对企业经营效率的影响,并对产权性质的调节作用加以分析。结果显示:分析师跟进能够显著提升企业经营效率;考虑到企业产权性质的区别,发现国有产权削弱了分析师对企业经营效率的促进作用。本文为分析师在证券市场发挥外部治理作用提供了新的佐证,也从侧面论证了国家进一步推行市场化的必要性。
This paper selects China’s main stock A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets for 2008-2014 as a sample to empirically study the impact of follow-up of analysts on the business efficiency of enterprises and to analyze the regulatory role of property rights. The result shows that the follow-up by analysts can significantly improve the efficiency of the enterprise. Considering the difference of the nature of the property rights of the enterprises, it is found that the state-owned property rights weaken the promoting role of analysts in the efficiency of the enterprises. This article provides new evidences for analysts to play the role of external governance in the securities market, and demonstrates the necessity of further marketization by the state from the side.