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在今年5月31日到6月1日斯德哥尔摩“Tele Krig”电子战讨论会上,一位资深的以色列军官谈了他对196O年以来以色列机载电子战的成败极珍贵的见解.他透露说,1967年以前以色列空军把电子战视为反防空作战条令中的“支援性的,而不是必不可少的措施”,当时强调超低空飞行和“飞行员的干劲”.这情况至少延续到1969年“消耗战”中引入SA-3地对空导弹为止.这种新型导弹给以色列造成的损失引起“统帅部的震惊”.空军内对电子战的看法发生了“重大变化”.制定了一项重要的研究与发展活动计划,加强人员培训,“改进维修保养措施”.即使那样,此后的经验表明,“那些处于试验情况下的系统起不到什么作用”,有些设备“根本就不工作”!
At a seminar on the “Tele Krig” electronic warfare in Stockholm from May 31 to June 1 this year, a senior Israeli military officer talked about his extremely valuable opinion on the success or failure of the Israeli airborne electronic war since 1910. He disclosed Before 1967, the Israeli air force viewed EW as a “supportive but not essential measure” in its anti-air combat doctrine, emphasizing ultra-low-altitude flight and “pilot's energy” at least as far back as 1969 The introduction of the SA-3 surface-to-air missile in the “war of attrition” resulted in “shocks” by the commander-in-chief in the loss caused to Israel by the new missile. “The Air Force has seen” significant changes “in its perception of electronic warfare. Important research and development activity plans, staffing enhancements, ”improving maintenance and repair measures.“ Even then, experience has shown that ”systems that are under experimental conditions do not work,“ and some devices ”do not work at all" !