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本文运用新制度经济学中的公共选择理论,从分析各个行政层级利益冲突的视角来解释“强县扩权”改革中的“体制梗阻”成因,并通过模型厘清了作为驱动主体的省的利益动机及其与地级市的博弈关系。通过分析发现:在地方分权的背景下,省在财税目标和地方竞争的双重激励下具有“强县扩权”改革的利益动机,省与市之间的利益冲突是“体制梗阻”的症结;省在追求自身利益最大化的前提下,并无利益动机去进一步解决“强县扩权”过程中产生的体制矛盾,以及矫治后续改革中可能出现的问题;由于“强县扩权”改变了市的激励与约束机制,造成市对省实施改革的非合作博弈,并且改革的效果很大程度上内生于现实条件中结构化的市县格局。最后,本文就结论提出了相关政策建议。
This paper uses the theory of public choice in the new institutional economics to explain the causes of “system obstruction ” in the reform of “expansion of county power ” from the perspective of analyzing the conflicts of interest at various administrative levels. By means of the model, Province’s interest motivation and game relationship with prefecture-level cities. Through the analysis we found that in the context of decentralization, the province has the motivation of interest in the reform of “powerful county expansion” under the double incentive of fiscal and taxation targets and local competition, and the conflict of interest between the provinces and municipalities is “the obstruction of system ”Under the premise of the pursuit of maximizing their own interests, there is no incentive to further solve the “ strong county expansion ”institutional conflicts arising in the process, as well as correction of possible problems in the follow-up reform; as “Strong county expansion” has changed the incentive and restraint mechanism of the city, resulting in a non-cooperative game between the city and the province, and the effect of the reform is largely endogenous to the structured city-county pattern under realistic conditions. Finally, this paper puts forward the relevant policy suggestions on the conclusion.