我们可能认为通过降低资本成本、披露质量,可以改善投资者利益。本文研究表明,该论断仅在有限的情况下是正确的。基于一个投资者完全竞争的生产经济,本文分析从以下三方面展开。第一,当新的投资足够有弹性,资本成本随着披露质量的提高而提高;第二,存在某些条件,在此情况下披露质量会减少现有投资者或新投资者的利益;最后,随着披露质量的变化,资本成本会与现有投资者或新投资者的利益成反方向变化。 We may think that by reducing the cost of capital, quality disclosure, investors can improve the interests. The research in this paper shows that this conclusion is correct only in limited circumstances. Based on a perfectly competitive production economy of investors, this paper analyzes the following three aspects. First, when the new investment is flexible enough, the cost of capital increases as the quality of the disclosure increases. Second, there are certain conditions in which disclosure of the quality reduces the interest of existing investors or new investors. Finally, , As the quality of disclosure changes, the cost of capital will change in the opposite direction to that of existing investors or new investors.