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财政分权和晋升激励向地方政府植入了为增长而竞争的基因,但这不足以解释中国地方政府对经济金融运行的影响为何远大于其他国家。我们认为,现有中国式分权的分析框架需考虑地方政府对金融杠杆的运用。本文研究发现,金融分权会加大通货膨胀和经济过热风险,从而促使中央政府紧缩调控。中央-地方财税关系在分税制改革相对固化后,中央政府更倾向于调整金融分权边界,以达到调控目的,从而使地方政府性债务增速逆经济周期变化。本文主要政策含义是:金融监管体制改革应统筹考虑建立双层金融监管体系,明确地方政府的金融管理职能,向地方政府金融放权作为逆周期调控手段的做法需要扭转。
Fiscal decentralization and promotion incentives have implanted local genes that compete for growth, but this is not enough to explain why the influence of Chinese local governments on economic and financial operations is far greater than that of other countries. In our opinion, the existing analytical framework for Chinese decentralization needs to consider the use of financial leverage by local governments. This study finds that the financial decentralization will increase the risk of inflation and economic overheating, prompting the central government to tighten regulation. Central-Local Fiscal Relations After the tax-sharing reform is relatively solidified, the central government prefers to adjust the boundary of financial decentralization so as to achieve the purpose of regulation and control so that the growth rate of local government debt will be adversely affected by the economic cycle. The main policy implications of this article are as follows: The reform of the financial regulatory system should take into consideration the establishment of a two-tier financial regulatory system, clarify the financial management functions of local governments, and reverse the downward adjustment of financial decentralization as a counter-cyclical regulatory measure.