中国国有上市公司开始对高级管理人员实行股票期权的激励形式,但这种激励形式在客观上却存在着严重的制度约束。国有企业内部的行政级别制度、股票市场的高投机性、监管制度和恶意收购制度的缺少都令股票期权激励机制难以实现其设立的目标。 China’s state-owned listed companies have begun to implement the incentive form of stock options for senior executives. However, there is an objective institutional constraint on such form of incentive. The administrative-level system of state-owned enterprises, the high speculativeness of the stock market, the lack of a regulatory system and a hostile takeover system all make it difficult for the stock option incentive mechanism to achieve its objective of establishment.