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We propose a new two-type-player prisoners dilemma game based on the division of work on a square lattice, in which a fraction of the population # are assigned type A and the rest B.In a one-shot two-player game, we let both of their original payoffs be scaled by a same multiplicative factor α > 1, if two neighboring players are of different types; however we leave the payoffs unchanged if they are of the same type.Then we show that combined with the two-type setup, the square lattice can assist to induce different social ranks according to players abilities to collect payoffs.Simulation results show that the density of cooperation is significantly promoted for a wide range of the temptation to defection parameters and that there are optimal values for both α and μ leading to the maximal cooperation level.We reach these results by analyzing the distribution of the players in the social ranks and we also show some typical snapshots of the system.