本文讨论了在国有中小型企业改制过程中 ,如何从股本结构策略的角度来吸引民间资本的问题。国有资本与民间资本的股权设置实际上可以看作是两者之间的博弈。本文利用博弈论中的“智猪模型”讨论了这个问题 ,得出结论 :在一定条件下 ,为了发展国有中小型企业 ,使国有资本实现真正的保值和增值 ,可以放弃国有资本对控股权的要求。 This article discusses how to attract private capitals from the perspective of equity structure strategy in the process of state-owned SMEs restructuring. Equity allocation between state-owned capital and private capital can actually be seen as a game between the two. This paper discusses this problem by using the “pig-cat model” in game theory and concludes that under certain conditions, in order to develop state-owned small and medium-sized enterprises so that the state-owned capital can truly preserve and increase its value, it can abandon the state- Claim.