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最近我们发现有个商业企业,在完成主管部门下达的销售、利润指标后的销售款,不再作营业收入,而是挂在“应付货款”上,其金额达230余万元,到了下期再察颜观色看主管部门下达任务的情况进行调整.他们这样做是怕实现利润报多了,主管部门鞭打快牛.这种真帐假做的情况,在某些地方相当普遍.我认为除了企业的原因外,就是由于主管部门财务指标管理制度不善.国家对企业实行利改税后,企业留利比例已成为推动企业提高经济效益强有力的经济杠杆,作为主管部门应该充分发挥这个经济杠杆的作用,不应再给所属企业下达什么指标.在扩大企业自主权后,指令性计划的作用是有限的,当主管部门所订的指标基本符合企业实际时,还有一定促进作用,但在大多数情况下,
Recently, we discovered that there was a commercial enterprise that, after completing the sales and profit targets issued by the competent authorities, no longer made operating income, but instead hung on “payable funds,” which amounted to more than 2.3 million yuan. Look at the situation in which the competent authorities issued tasks to adjust. They are afraid to achieve more profit reports, and the competent departments whip fast. This situation of false accounts is quite common in some places. I think that in addition to corporate The reason is that due to the poor management system of the financial indicators of the competent departments. After the state implements profits-and-tax reforms on enterprises, the proportion of profit-making enterprises has become a powerful economic lever to promote the economic efficiency of enterprises, and as the competent department should fully play the role of this economic lever. , should not give any of the indicators issued by their affiliated companies. In the expansion of corporate autonomy, the role of mandatory plans is limited, when the indicators set by the competent authorities are basically in line with the actual business, there is a certain promotion, but in most Under the circumstances,